Guest Author - David Landry

What if the conventional wisdom about how to measure performance in baseball is wrong? How did one baseball team, using more accurate measures, construct a low cost but effective team by staffing players whose value by conventional measures is low? It’s been three years since Michael Lewis answered these questions in “Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game” and I think now is a good time to revisit this groundbreaking work.

The premise is that being a baseball general manager is like being a bond trader – it’s a matter of assembling a winning portfolio using under valued assets. Under valued assets are found through statistics that expose market inefficiencies. Lewis, a former bond trader and business reporter, has the perfect background to present the case clearly.

It’s a very well drawn book that serves as an excellent layman’s introduction to sabermetrics (the science of baseball statistics) without going into painstaking detail. The profiles of the various characters in his story are quite engaging. You get the renegade baseball front office of the Oakland A’s – Billy Beane and Paul DePodesta; Bill James, the father of sabermetrics; and, interesting portraits of several players who were not valued by traditional thinkers in baseball, but who ultimately thrived in Oakland.

I thought the profile of submarine pitcher Chad Bradford was worth the price of the book. Bradford had always said he wanted to be a professional baseball player when he grew up. There was only one problem – he was a mediocre player. Until, that is, his high school coach taught him how to pitch with a side arm delivery. This made him good enough to play in junior college. As Chad climbed the ladder from college to AAA, his delivery moved from side arm to underhand and became deadly. The problem was that it didn’t “look right” to conventional scouts, so Chad was overlooked. Even though he pitched successfully for the White Sox, he was sent back to AAA without explanation. This is where Paul DePodesta “discovered” Chad by screening AAA for players with good DIPS (Defense Independent Pitching Statistics). Beane acquired him from Chicago for a player to be named later. In Oakland, Chad became one of the best arms in the bullpen and a bargain at only $300,000.

After the book came out, Beane’s methods were simultaneously vilified by the baseball establishment and adopted by a few GMs. The critics looked for every opportunity to point out Beane mistakes. My favorite example of hindsight being 20/20 is that Beane fired his scouting director for Jeremy Bonderman in the first round of the 2001 draft. Bonderman has turned out to be a decent investment after all. Regardless, one anecdote doesn’t invalidate the approach.

Beane’s search for value is, by its nature, is one that must evolve over time. When other organizations catch on to a measure, new ones must be found that will help identify under valued players. As a result, the statistical methods have become increasingly complex. This makes Beane’s job harder. Another impact is the fact Beane’s reputation has made it harder for him to deal with other GMs. Lewis has provided insights into his approach that they can exploit. In addition, a new breed of quantitatively oriented GMs has found homes in places like Toronto, Boston and Arizona. These GMs all have much larger payrolls than Beane and can play Moneyball on a whole new level.

If, like me, it’s been years since you’ve read Moneyball, it’s worth another look. If you’ve never read it, do it now!


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